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SURVEY OF RECENT DECISIONS IN THE 
LAW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
By Smith, Somerville & Case 
Baltimore, Maryland 
I. INJURIES COVERED BY ACT 
A. Occupational Disease - Stress in Employment 
The court of appeals ruled that a computer opera-
tor, who was subjected to continued harassment by 
fellow employees, was not entitled to workers' com-
pensation benefits under his claim for occupational 
disease. The claimant alleged continued harassment by 
management and fellow employees, including having an 
explosive placed in his cigarette, having his vehicle 
followed by co-workers, receiving annoying phone 
calls at home, and being called racially offensive names 
by co-workers. The claimant was diagnosed as having 
post-traumatic stress, and he filed an occupational 
disease claim. The Commission disallowed the claim 
and the circuit court granted the employer's motion for 
summary judgment finding that even if the claimant's 
allegations were true, the employer was entitled to 
judgment as a matter oflaw. Prior to the court of special 
appeals' consideration, the court of appeals on its own 
motion issued a writ of certiorari and affirmed the 
circuit court. 
The court noted that an occupational disease is a 
disease contracted by a covered employee that arises 
out of and in the course of employment and that causes 
the employee to become partially or totally incapacitat-
ed. The court reasoned that to be compensable, an 
occupational disease under section 9-502( d) must be 
due to the nature of an employment in which the hazards 
of the disease exist. The court found that the claimant's 
job duties as a computer operator included entering data 
and preparing paperwork, answering telephones and 
reading manuals. Harassment by fellow employees was 
not a hazard within the nature of the employment of a 
computer data operator, and there was nothing peculiar 
to the claimant's duties as a computer operator that 
made him more susceptible to harassment than any 
other kind of employment. Accordingly, the court held 
that the claimant had not sustained a compensable 
occupational disease based on stress. The court went 
on to state that it was not willing to rule out the 
possibility that some gradually resulting, purely mental 
disease could be a compensable occupational disease. 
Davis v. Dynacorp, 336 Md. 226, 647 A.2d 446 (1994). 
Decided September 15, 1994. 
B. Pre-Employment Physical Examination 
The court of special appeals ruled that a claimant 
who is inj ured during a pre-employment physical exam-
ination may be entitled to workers' compensation ben-
efits. The claimant applied for employment in Novem-
ber 1990 and was interviewed in December 1990. 
Thereafter, an hourly rate was agreed upon, and the 
claimant was instructed to report for a physical exam-
ination on January 4, 1991. The employer testified that 
this was a "pre-employment physical." The claimant 
contended that attending the physical was her first job 
duty. While walking to the lab, the claimant fell and 
injured her knee. She was treated and then sent for the 
examination. The claimant returned to the personnel 
department, was introduced to employees and left for 
the day. Subsequent to working on the January 7-8, the 
claimant left due to a family emergency, returned to 
work in March 1991, and again left the employment of 
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the hospital. The claimant was paid for two hours work 
on the day ofthe physical, although the date of hire was 
listed as January 7, 1991 in employer records. The 
hospital argued that this payment was in error and that 
the physical examination was a condition precedent to 
her employment. The claimant argued that she was a 
paid employee as of January 4, 1991, and that the 
examination was not a condition precedent to employ-
ment. 
The Commission found that the claimant did not 
sustain a compensable injury as there was not an 
employer/employee relationship on January, 4, 1991. 
The circuit court reversed the Commission and found 
that the claimant did sustain a compensable injury and 
the employer appealed. The court of special appeals 
held that if an employer requires an individual to receive 
a physical examination on its premises, and the reason 
for the examination is for the employer's benefit, there 
exists sufficient direction and control by the employer 
for the examination to be within the scope of coverage 
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The court distin-
guished such an examination from physical agility tests 
that are used to allow a job applicant to demonstrate 
qualifications for a particular job. 
It is worth noting that this decision was made in the 
context of a claim in which the claimant was seeking 
workers' compensation benefits. As such, the benev-
olent purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act 
were cited by the court in reaching a decision favorable 
to the claimant. In its review of decisions from other 
jurisdictions, the court hinted that the result may have 
been different if this issue had arisen in the context of 
a tort suit and the putative employer had raised the 
exclusive immunity defense of workers' compensation 
as a shield against the plaintiff s claim of negligence. 
Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Jacobson, 98 Md. App. 587, 
634 A.2d 969 (1993). Decided December 29, 1993. 
C. Traveling to Receive Medical Treatment 
The court of special appeals addressed the issue of 
whether an injury suffered while en route to medical 
treatment for a prior compensable injury is itself 
compensable even if the earlier injury was notacontrib-
uting factor in the second injury. 
The claimant sustained an accidental injury on July 
5, 1989 for which he received workers' compensation 
benefits. While entering a building to receive pre-
- :; .. 
scribed physical therapy for his compensable injury, the 
claimant slipped and fell on ice and injured his left wrist 
and shoulder. The Commission found that the claim-
ant's new injuries were not compensable. The circuit 
court affirmed, granting summary judgment in favor of 
the employer. The court of special appeals reversed this 
judgment. 
The court of special appeals noted that when an 
employee suffers additional injuries in the course of a 
journey to a doctor's office occasioned by a compensable 
injury, the additional injuries are generally held to be 
compensable. The court stated that the rationale for this 
rule is that, because the employer has a statutory duty to 
provide medical care for the earlier compensable injury 
and the employee has a statutory duty to submit to and 
accept that care, the work-related injury effectively 
causes the journey. The trip, in effect, arises in the 
course of and out of the employment, rendering the 
accidental injury compensable. Professor Larson calls 
this approach "quasi-course of employment," which 
subsumes those reasonable and necessary acts that are 
not strictly within the course of employment but would 
not have been undertaken but for the compensable 
injury. An injured employee need not show that the first 
injury contributed to the second accident. 
Harris v. Mackin & Assocs., 100 Md. App. 363, 641 
A.2d 938 (1994). Decided June 1, 1994. 
D. Exception to the Going and Coming Rule/Intox-
ication 
The court of special appeals addressed the issues of 
the free transportation exception to the going and 
coming rule and intoxication as a bar to benefits. 
The claimant was injured in a one-car accident while 
driving his own vehicle from an airport to his home on 
return from a business trip. The claimant's job duties 
required him to travel throughout the United States and 
his employer reimbursed expenses of business travel, 
including the cost of transportation to and from the 
airport. A toxicology examination of the claimant 
following the accident revealed a blood alcohol content 
of 206 mg/dl, which expert evidence determined would 
probably impair judgment, coordination, and response 
time while driving. The claimant had testified at the 
Commission that due to medical problems, he only slept 
one to one and one-half hours per night during the 
business trip and that sleep deprivation was a proximate 
cause of the injuries. 
Following a Commission hearing on contesting 
issues of whether the claimant sustained an accidental 
injury arising out of and in the course of employment 
and whether intoxication was the sole cause of the 
claimant's injury, the Commission ruled that the claim-
ant did not sustain an accidental injury. The circuit court 
reversed the Commission's decision and granted sum-
mary judgment for the claimant, finding as a matter of 
law that the claimant sustained an accidental injury 
arising out of and in the course of employment and that 
intoxication was not a bar to benefits. The employer 
filed an appeal to the court of special appeals. 
The court of special appeals vacated the circuit 
court's decision and remanded the case for trial by 
ruling that whether the claimant's lost sleep was a 
contributing cause to the injury was a material fact in 
dispute and properly a jury issue, not a matter to be 
disposed of by summary judgment. 
Although the circuit court did not rule that the 
claimant sustained a compensable injury under the free 
transportation exception, the court of special appeals 
held that this exception applied as a matter of law and 
that appellate courts can affirm summary judgment 
based on a ground not relied upon by the circuit court. 
The court of special appeals held that the free transpor-
tation exception applies when an employer expressly or 
impliedly provides transportation or reimburses ex-
penses that bear a relationship to reasonable travel 
expenses. Since the employer had obligated itself to 
provide for the claimant's transportation during busi-
ness trips, from the time he left home until the time he 
returned, the free transportation exception applied as a 
matter of law. 
Accordingly, the court of special appeals remanded 
the case for trial on the single issue of whether intoxi-
cation was the sole cause of the claimant's injury. 
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Lorkovic, 100Md.App.333, 
641 A.2d. 924 (1994). Decided June 1, 1994. 
E. Uninsured Owner o/Corporation Entitled to 
Workers' Compensation Benefits 
The court of special appeals ruled that the owner, 
president, and employee of a closely held corporation 
that did not carry workers' compensation insurance is 
considered a covered employee under the Workers' 
Compensation Act and is entitled to seek redress from 
the Uninsured Employees' Fund. 
The claimant and his wife were owners of a closely 
held corporation, the claimant serving as president and 
his wife as vice-president. In February 1991, the 
claimant fell while working at a construction site and 
was seriously injured and hospitalized for almost two 
months. At the time of the claimant's accident, the 
corporation did not retain workers' compensation cov-
erage. Thus, the claimant filed a claim for workers' 
compensation seeking benefits from the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund. The Workers' Compensation Com-
mission ruled that the claimant was not a covered 
employee under the Workers' Compensation Act and 
was denied benefits. The claimant appealed this deci-
sion to the circuit court which affirmed the Commis-
sion' s decision. The claimantthen filed an appeal to the 
court of special appeals. 
The court noted that section 9-206(a) of the Act 
states that an officer of a corporation is a covered 
employee if the officer provides a service to the corpo-
ration for monetary compensation. However, accord-
ing to this section, an officer of a close corporation has 
the option of electing to be exempt from workers' 
compensation coverage. In order to be exempt, the 
section requires the claimant to submit to the Commis-
sion and to the insurer of the corporation a written 
notice that he/she has elected to be excluded from 
coverage. The Uninsured Employers' Fund argued that 
this section did not apply because the claimant did not 
possess workers' compensation coverage for his cor-
poration. The court of special appeals disagreed and 
noted that the clear meaning of section 9-206, which 
grants the claimant the status of a covered employee 
unless he expressly exempts himself, cannot be negated. 
The claimant's failure to obtain insurance is "not inter-
related with the determination of eligibility for compen-
sation from the Uninsured Employers' Fund." 
Although the court determined that the claimant 
was a covered employee and entitled to seek benefits 
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund, it added that the 
Uninsured Employers' Fund has a responsibility to 
pursue the claimant's failure to secure insurance in the 
manner it deems appropriate, including criminal penal-
ties in the form of fines or imprisonment. 
Lutter v. Lutter Constr., Inc., 103 Md.App. 292, 653 
A.2d 517 (1995). 
----~--~---~----- --~-----. 
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II. BENEFITS PAYABLE UNDER THEACT 
A. Death Benefits - Partial Dependency 
The court of special appeals considered the issue of 
whether a partially dependent minor should continue to 
receive dependency benefits until age eighteen even if 
benefits totaling $17,500 are received prior to the 
attainment of age eighteen. The appellate court upheld 
the trial court's decision and stated that section 9-682 
of the Workers' Compensation Act requires that survi-
vor benefits of a partial dependent be capped at $17,500. 
The deceased was killed in a work-related accident 
and was survived by a partial dependent who began 
receiving death benefits. Benefits in the amount of 
$17,500 were paid prior to the partial dependent's 
eighteenth birthday. When the cap of $17,500 was 
reached, payments were terminated. The issue arose as 
to whether the recodification of the death benefit statute 
had eliminated the cap on partial dependency benefits. 
The trial court as well as the appellate court deter-
mined that the statute clearly states that the $17,500 
figure with respect to a partial dependent is an absolute 
cap. Unlike the case of a wholly dependent spouse, 
even ifthe partial dependency continues, no additional 
benefits are due. Both courts found that the legislature 
clearly intended to treat wholly and partially dependent 
individuals differently. The appellate court noted that 
while it is correct to state that the Workers' Compen-
sation Act is to be construed liberally in favor of 
claimants, this does not mean that the Act should be 
construed to provide compensation beyond an autho-
rized period. Although section 9-682 of the Act is a 
recently revised section, it is clear that the legislature 
intended that it be recodified without substantive change. 
The court noted that an abrogation of the $17,500 cap 
for partial dependents under the age of 18 would be a 
substantive change in the law, which the legislature did 
not intend. 
Barr v. Barberry Bros., 99 Md. App. 33, 635 A.2d 64 
(1994). Decided January 6, 1994. 
B. Set-off Against Workers' Compensation Bene-
fits 
The court of appeals ruled that disability retirement 
payments made pursuant to Article 101, section 33(b) 
(now LE § 9-601, recodified without substantive change) 
operated to set-off vocational rehabilitation benefits. 
The claimant was employed as a correctional officer for 
the Montgomery County Department of Corrections 
and sustained a compensable injury to her back, which 
prevented her from returning to that employment. After 
receiving a period of temporary total disability benefits, 
the claimant began receiving vocational rehabilitation 
benefits. At the same time, she also began receiving 
service-connected disability retirement benefits from 
the county, which amounted to two-thirds of her salary. 
The county claimed a set-offpursuant to the applicable 
statute and terminated the claimant's monetary benefit 
under vocational rehabilitation. The claimant chal-
lenged this action, and the Commission ordered the 
county to pay compensation during vocational rehabil-
itation. The county appealed. The circuit court granted 
summary judgment for the county, reversing the Com-
mission and holding that, as a matter oflaw, the statute 
operated to set-off the claimant's disability retirement 
payments against vocational rehabilitation weekly 
benefits. The claimant appealed this decision and the 
court of appeals, on its own motion, issued a writ of 
certiorari prior to consideration by the intermediate 
court. 
The court first noted that for the statutory offset to 
operate, the benefits received under the pension plan 
and workers' compensation must be "similar." The 
court stated that while ordinary retirement benefits may 
not trigger the offset, it is well settled that disability 
pension benefits are similar to workers' compensation 
payments and will trigger the offset, even if disability 
pension benefits result from a contributory plan. The 
court concluded that benefits received under the disabil-
ity retirement plan and vocational rehabilitation benefits 
are similar within the meaning of the statute. The court 
rejected the claimant's arguments that vocational reha-
bilitation benefits are intended to rehabilitate an injured 
worker rather than to replace lost wages. The court 
reasoned that although vocational rehabilitation 
benefits are intended to rehabilitate an injured worker, 
the cash payments during vocational rehabilitation are 
a distinct provision intended to be a substitute for wages 
while the beneficiary is recovering or retraining. There-
fore, the cash payment component of the vocational 
rehabilitation benefit is similar to the disability pension 
benefit, and the county is, therefore, entitled to an offset. 
The court also noted that under the claimant's theory, 
the claimant would receive four-thirds of her prior 
salary; the court did not believe the legislature intended 
to allow such a windfall. 
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Fikar v. Montgomery County, 333 Md. 430, 635 A.2d 
977 (1994). Decided January 19, 1994. 
C. Injuries to Scheduled Members and Other 
Cases 
The court of special appeals ruled that in cases 
where the claimant injures two scheduled members, the 
Commission may make an award for each scheduled 
member or under "other cases," whichever results in 
greater compensation for the claimant. The claimant 
was shot in the head while on duty for the Baltimore City 
Police Department, which resulted in the total loss of 
vision in both eyes, total loss of sense of smell and taste, 
and a head injury from the bullet that remained lodged 
in the brain. At the Commission, it was stipulated that 
the claimant was completely blind in both eyes, and the 
Commission issued an order finding that the claimant 
sustained an 85% industrial loss ofthe body as a whole. 
The claimant appealed this order to the circuit court, 
which reversed the Commission and found that the 
claimant should be awarded 500 weeks for the total loss 
of vis ion under the schedule of specific injuries, plus an 
additional 167 weeks for serious disability, and remand-
ed the case to the Commission to further determine 
entitlementto permanent partial disability under "other 
cases" for the loss of sense of smell and taste, as well as 
the head injury. The employer appealed this decision to 
the court of special appeals, which affirmed the circuit 
court's ruling. 
The court noted that the legislature determined that 
the compensation for the loss of use of an eye shall be 
250 weeks. The court also noted that Larson and prior 
Maryland decisions concluded that where a claimant 
injures two scheduled members, an award may be issued 
under the "other cases" provision in order to compen-
sate the claimant beyond the schedule of specific disabil-
ities. The court contrasted the loss of use of two eyes 
to a situation where a claimant has both thumbs ampu-
tated. Under the scheduled member provision, a claim-
ant would only receive 200 weeks of disability for the 
total loss of both thumbs. Therefore, in that instance it 
would be appropriate to award disability under "other 
cases" as the loss of two thumbs may entitle a claimant 
to more than twice the disability for the loss of one 
thumb. In contrast, the court stated that since the 
claimant should be awarded the higher measure of 
compensation, where a claimant loses the total use of 
both eyes, the proper calculation would be to award 
disability under he schedule ofbenefits, which would be 
equivalent to 500 weeks of disability plus additional 
weeks for serious disability, rather than a lesser amount 
under the "other cases" provision. 
Mayor of Baltimore v. Cassidy, 99 Md. App. 465, 637 
A.2d 897 (1994). Decided April 8, 1994. 
D. Posthumous Claim for Permanent Disability 
Under Other Cases 
The court of special appeals ruled that a posthumous 
claim forpermanentdisability under "other cases" may be 
made after a claimant's death if sufficient evidence is 
presented for an award of benefits to be made. The 
claimant was injured on February 20, 1991 and received 
temporary total disability benefits through the date of 
his death from unrelated causes on November 9,1991. 
Thereafter, his widow, as substitute claimant, pur-
sued a claim for permanent disability benefits. At 
the hearing, the claimant offered evidence from the 
treating physician opining that the decedent had reached 
maximum medical improvement as ofJune 10, 1991 and 
was permanently totally disabled. The Commission 
found that the claimant was not entitled to any perma-
nent disability benefits because the decedent had not 
reached maximum medical improvement prior to his 
death. On appeal to the circuit court, cross motions for 
summary judgment were filed. The claimant argued 
that the decedent had, as a matter of law, reached 
maximum medical improvement prior to his death. This 
motion was denied, as the court found that there was a 
dispute of material fact. The court granted the employ-
er's motion for summary judgment, holding that, as a 
matter of law, there could not have been enough 
evidence for a decision to be made as to industrial loss 
of use. A motion to alter or amend judgment, arguing 
that a determination of the decedent's industrial loss 
could have been made based on medical records as to 
the decedent's inability to return to work, was denied 
and this appeal followed. 
The court of special appeals reversed the circuit 
court and held that there was a genuine dispute of facts 
concerning the claim for permanent disability benefits. 
The court initially held that posthumous disability rat-
ings may be used as evidence in workers' compensation 
cases. Moreover, the mere fact that the employer did 
not have the opportunity to cross examine the decedent 
__ ~ ____________ . ____________________ .25.3/:.;. Bait. :_.?" ~~ 
as to the extent of his injuries does not bar a claim for 
benefits. Finally, the court rejected the employer's 
argument that no evidence of loss of earning capacity 
was present, and therefore no finding of industrial loss 
of use could be made since a finding of industrial loss 
under "other cases" is equivalent to a finding ofloss of 
earning capacity. The court noted that, based on the 
treating physician's report, evidence was available, if 
believed, that the decedent would have no post-injury 
wages at all as he was permanently totally disabled. 
Moreover, the court noted the difference between pre-
and post-injury earnings may be considered in deciding 
the amount of loss of industrial use but that it is not 
mandatory and an inability to produce evidence of post-
injury wages should not by itself defeat a claim for 
benefits. 
Ralphv. Sears, Roebuck& Co., 102 Md. App. 387,649 
A.2d 1179. Decided December 1, 1994. 
E. Public Safety Employee Under Workers' Com-
pensation Act 
The court of appeals ruled that deputy sheriffs in 
counties which have established police departments do 
not meet the definition of public safety employees under 
the Workers' Compensation Act and, therefore, do not 
qualify to receive the increased rate of compensation 
provided to public safety employees. Deputy sheriffs in 
counties with no police departments will be provided 
the higher rate of compensation. 
The claimant sustained an inj ury to her right foot in 
the course of her employment as a Howard County 
deputy sheriff. The parties agreed that as a result ofthe 
inj ury, she sustained a 10% permanent partial disability, 
but they were unable to agree on the rate of compensa-
tion to be paid to the claimant. The claimant insisted 
that she should be compensated as a public safety 
employee pursuant to section 9-628 of the Act and 
receive the higher rate of compensation which is pro-
vided to certain firefighters, firefighting instructors, 
paramedics and, most importantly, police officers. The 
Workers' Compensation Commission determined that 
the claimant did not qualify as a public safety employee. 
The claimant appealed the Commission's decision to 
the circuit court where summary judgment was granted 
in favor of the employer. The claimant then appealed 
to the court of special appeals. However, before the 
case was considered, the court of appeals decided to 
review the case on its own motion. 
In reaching the decision that deputy sheriffs in 
counties which have police departments do not qualify 
as public safety employees for purposes of the Act, the 
court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Soper v. Mont-
gomery County, 294 Md. 331, 449 A.2d 1158 (1982). 
In the Soper case, the court similarly treated deputy 
sheriffs differently than police officers with respect to 
the presumption of compensability of heart disease and 
hypertension contained in section 9-503. In the Soper 
decision, as in this decision, the court stated that the 
establishment of a police department in a county results 
in a dichotomy between the daily functioning of police 
officers and deputy sheriffs. The court noted that in the 
present case, the Howard County job descriptions clear-
ly revealed this dichotomy. The court rejected the 
claimant's argument that her responsibilities were sim-
ilar to those of a police officer, and that as a deputy 
sheriff she retained the powers that sheriffs possessed at 
common law which encompassed the same duties as 
those of police officers. Further, the court reviewed the 
express language of LE section 9-628 and opined that 
since the section made no mention of deputy sheriffs, the 
legislative intent was clear. 
Shah v. Howard County, CA No. 54, Sept. Term 1994. 
Decided February 6, 1995. 
III. APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
A. Right of Employer 's Corporate Representative 
to be Present at Trial - Harmless Error and Preserva-
tion of Issue for Appellate Review 
The court of appeals reversed the decision of the 
court of special appeals, which ruled that the trial court 
had committed reversible error when the court tempo-
rarily excluded the employer's designated representa-
tive from the courtroom. 
After her claim was disallowed by the Commission, 
the claimant appealed to the circuit court where a jury 
returned a verdict in her favor. The employer appealed 
to the court of special appeals, arguing that it was 
entitled to a new trial because the trial court had 
erroneously excluded the employer's designated repre-
sentative from the courtroom during a significant por-
tion of the claimant's direct examination. The court of 
special appeals found that error had been committed and 
the case was remanded for a new trial. The court of 
appeals granted certiorari. 
The court of appeals examined the issue of witness 
exclusion and relied mainly on the case of Sa/eway 
Stores v. Watson, 317 Md. 178,561 A.2d 1242 (1989). 
Watson specifically states that a party that is not a 
natural person has very broad latitude in the selection of 
a representative when witnesses are excluded, and the 
exercise of this right is not subject to the discretion of 
the trialjudge. Watson also indicates that it is appropri-
ate to presume prejudice from the wrongful exclusion of 
a party, or its representative, from a trial. However, the 
court of appeals noted that the issue of prejudice must 
be properly preserved for review. 
Here, the court found that the issue of prejudice had 
not been preserved by the employer's counsel. The 
court reasoned that the trial judge recognized her error 
in excluding the designated representative and quickly 
took steps to remedy the situation by allowing the 
representative to return to the courtroom and take a seat 
at the trial table. If the exclusion had been prejudicial 
and infringed upon the employer's right to a fair trial, 
then counsel for the employer had an 0 bligation, by way 
of moving for a mistrial or for other corrective action, 
to inform the trialjudge thatthe remedy was inadequate. 
Otherwise, the employer is presumed to acquiesce in the 
court's corrective action. The court of appeals went on 
to state that even if the employer had properly preserved 
the issue of prej udice for consideration, the error would 
be deemed harmless as it would not have influenced the 
outcome of the litigation. 
Bobbitt v. Allied-Signal, 334 Md. 347, 639 A.2d 142 
(1994). Decided April 8, 1994. 
B. Instruction to Jury as to Presumption of Cor-
rectness o/Commission Decision 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
court of special appeals, which ruled that the trial 
court's refusal to instruct the jury as to the Commis-
sion's decision was reversible error. The Commission 
initially found that the claimant was an independent 
contractor and, therefore, not entitled to workers' 
compensation benefits. On appeal, the circuit court 
refused the employer's request for a jury instruction that 
the claim had previously been heard and decided by the 
Commission. The instruction, Maryland Civil Pattern 
Jury Instruction 30: 3, would have instructed the jury as 
to the Commission's decision finding the claimant was 
an independent contractor, that the Commission's de-
cision is presumed to be correct, and that the claimant 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the Commission was wrong. Rather, the 
trial court merely instructed the jury that the claimant 
was presumed to be an independent contractor and that 
she had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence that she was an employee. The jury found that 
the claimant was an employee, and the court of special 
appeals reversed the trial court by ruling that the court 
committed reversible error when it failed to inform the 
jury as to the Commission's decision and its presump-
tion of correctness. 
The court of appeals, in a 6-1 decision, affirmed the 
intermediate appellate court's decision based on the 
same rationale. The court reviewed the applicable 
statute and decided that the legislative intent was for 
juries to be instructed as to the Commission's decision 
and its presumed correctness. The court noted that an 
instruction that provides a burden of proof but fails to 
explain the basis of that presumption may result in 
disregard ofthe instruction by the jury because it could 
appear to be without reason. Therefore, since the 
instruction given did not cover the substance of the 
employer's requested instruction as to the Commis-
sion's decision, the court remanded for a new trial. 
The sole dissenting judge opined that the failure to 
tell the jury of the source of the presumption was not so 
prejudicial that a new trial was warranted. In essence, 
the dissent argued only harmless error had been com-
mitted. 
Holman v. Kelly Catering, Inc., 334 Md. 480,639 A.2d 
701, (1994). Decided April 15, 1994. 
C. Admissibility of Medical Records In Workers' 
Compensation Appeals 
The court of special appeals considered the issue of 
what medical records are admissible in a workers' 
compensation appeal at a de novo trial in the circuit 
court. The Commission found that the claimant was 
permanently totally disabled, 50% ofthe disability due 
to the accidental inj ury, 40% due to pre-existing condi-
tions and 10% due to subsequent unrelated disability. 
The claimant appealed to the circuit court. At trial, the 
claimant presented testimony of its expert witness via 
video deposition. During the deposition, the claimant's 
expert commented upon an evaluation report prepared 
by an expert for the SubsequentInjury Fund, and during 
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cross-examination, counsel for the employer asked the 
claimant's expert to comment on a medical evaluation 
prepared by the employer's own expert. Claimant's 
counsel objected on the grounds of hearsay and moved 
that the testimony be stricken. 
At trial, the claimant introduced the video deposi-
tion into evidence. Over objection, the court permitted 
the line of questioning of the claimant's expert regard-
ing the reports of opposing parties' experts. At the 
opening of the defense's case, the Subsequent Injury 
Fund moved to have its expert's report admitted into 
evidence. Over obj ection by the claimant, the trial court 
ruled that the two reports were admissible even though 
the expert witnesses were not present in court and 
subject to cross-examination. The jury found that the 
claimant had an 85% permanent industrial disability, 
55% due to the work-related injury, 25% pre-existing 
and 5% due to unrelated disability. The claimant noted 
an appeal to the court of special appeals. 
The court of special appeals ruled that the trial court 
committed reversible error when it admitted into evi-
dence the two written independent medical evaluations 
because they were hearsay evidence. Prejudice was 
shown to the claimant because each report was less 
favorable than the claimant's expert witness's testimo-
ny. The court ruled that, notwithstanding section 9-745 
of the Act, which provides that proceedings in an appeal 
shall be informal and summary, the trial court must 
comply with the applicable rules of evidence. 
This decision is important because it provides guide-
lines for the admissibility of different types of medical 
reports in trials of workers' compensation appeals. 
Hospital records are admissible as business records as 
long as the information contained in them is patholog-
ically gem1ane to the claimant's treatment. This in-
cludes medical opinions expressed in hospital records. 
Less clear is the admissibility of reports of treating 
physicians as business records. The court specifically 
chose not to address that issue, but the ground work was 
certainly laid to allow the admission of treating physi-
cian's records insofar as they contain information patho-
logically germane to the treatment. 
Also found to be admissible are reports relied upon 
by a testifying expert in rendering an opinion. In order 
for these reports to be admissible, however, it must be 
established that reports of that type are reasonably 
relied upon by experts in that field. 
Finally, reports of non-treating physicians are not 
admissible because they do not have the same guaran-
tees oftrustworthiness as treatment records. The court 
did not reach the question of whether such reports 
would even qualify as business records. Based on the 
decision in this case, it is clear that evaluation reports of 
non-treating physicians should not be admitted over 
objection. This opinion is also instructive on the proper 
method to preserve objections to videotaped testimony 
and information omitted from interrogatory answers. 
The court also ruled that a trial court has broad 
discretion in whether to permit a witness to testify as an 
expert. The court noted that a witness "must demon-
strate a minimal amount of competence or expertise on 
the subject on which he is allegedly an expert in order 
to be qualified to testify as an expert witness." Since the 
jury was instructed thatthe value of an expert's testimo-
ny should be weighed against the extent of the expert's 
training and experience, the court found no error on this 
issue. 
Chadderton v. MA. Bongivonni, Inc., 101 Md. App. 
472, 647 A.2d 137 (1994). Decided September 6, 
1994. 
D. Discoverability of Tax Returns 
The court of special appeals ruled that federal and 
state tax returns of a claimant are discoverable if 
relevant, and are not privileged under either federal or 
state law. The claimant was denied vocational rehabil-
itation and temporary total disability benefits and ap-
pealed to the circuit court. During the pending appeal, 
the employer requested that the claimant provide the 
amount reported as earned income on the past five 
income tax returns. The claimant refused to respond to 
the interrogatory and the employer sought to compel 
production of the actual tax returns. The claimant 
averred that since his income tax returns were filed 
jointly with his spouse, production of such records 
would violate the rights and privileges of the claimant 
and his wife. The circuit court granted the employer's 
motion to compel production of the tax returns, and 
when the claimant still refused to comply, the court 
dismissed the appeal. The claimant appealed to the 
court of special appeals. 
The appellate court noted that both federal and state 
law on confidentiality of income tax returns pertains 
only to governmental employees and has no bearing on 
whether a taxpayer can be forced to disclose his person-
al tax returns. As there was no Maryland case on point, 
the court reviewed other states' decisions, and noted a 
minority opinion allowing the taxpayer to claim a 
privilege and a majority opinion concluding that state 
and federal income tax returns were not privileged. This 
majority position was split between states holding that 
tax returns are not privileged and are fully discoverable 
and states holding that tax returns are not privileged but 
only relevant portions of the tax return are discoverable. 
The court adopted the majority opinion that ruled that 
neither federal nor state tax returns are privileged from 
disclosure by the taxpayer, but that only relevant parts 
of the tax return are discoverable. The claimant may 
redact those parts relating solely to his wife's income. 
The court further ruled that since tax returns could 
contain information directly pertaining to the claimant's 
ability to perform the type of work for which he was 
previously qualified and to his overall ability to work, 
that information was relevant to issues of entitlement to 
vocational rehabilitation and temporary total disability. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that if the subject 
interrogatory had actually called for the production of 
tax returns, those documents would have been discov-
erable. Since the interrogatory did not request the 
actual tax return, but merely the amount reported as 
earned income, the court vacated the circuit court's 
decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, 
thereby giving the claimant an opportunity to respond 
to the discovery request and provide the requested 
information. 
Ashton v. Churn Contracting Corp., 102 Md. App. 87, 
648 A.2d 1067 (1994). Decided October 27,1994. 
IV. WORKERS'COMPENSATIONCOMMISSION 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
A. Limitations Period for Reopening Claims 
- No.1 
The court of special appeals ruled that an insurer is 
not estopped from raising limitations even when it fails 
to respond to a claimant's request for additional benefits 
made prior to the running oflimitations. The claimant 
was awarded workers' compensation benefits, and the 
last payment of compensation occurred on September 
19, 1985. On August 6, 1990, the claimant's attorney 
by letter requested additional temporary total disability 
benefits. The insurer did not respond to the request, and 
the claimant filed issues with the Commission seeking 
additional benefits on September 24, 1990, after the 
five-year period had lapsed. The Commission found 
that the claim was barred by limitations, but the trial 
court reversed and found that the claim was not barred. 
The court's rationale was either that the silence by the 
insurer in response to the request for additional benefits 
amounted to an estoppel by silence, or that the letter to 
the insurer was the legal equivalent of the filing ofissues 
with the Commission, or both. The insurer filed an 
appeal to the court of special appeals, which reversed 
the trial court's decision. 
The court held that the trial court erred in finding 
estoppel or waiver of the bar of limitations. The 
rationale was that, as a matter oflaw, an insurer cannot 
be estopped from raising limitations based on an allega-
tion of silence in response to a request for benefits. The 
court reviewed several cases regarding the issue of 
limitations and estoppel, and found that the general rule 
is that mere silence does not create estoppel. The court 
distinguished a 1906 opinion relied on by the claimant, 
and found that the claimant could have filed his claim 
with the Commission regardless of counsel's letter to 
the insurer. Moreover, the court concluded that an 
insurer has no duty to advise a claimant of possiblt:: 
defenses. Therefore, silence cannot be a basis for 
equitable estoppel. Finally, the court discussed several 
cases in which a party was held to be estopped, and 
indicated that egregious positive actions must be taken 
by that party in order for it to be estopped from raising 
limitations. 
Mayor of Cumberland v. Beall, 97 Md. App. 597,631 
A.2d 506 (1993). Decided October 5, 1993. Cert. 
denied 333 Md. 200, 634 A.2d 61 (1993). Decided 
December 17, 1993. 
B. Limitations Periodfor Reopening Claims 
- No.2 
The court of special appeals addressed the issue of 
whether the Commission has the discretion to annul an 
order and reinstate a claim for benefits that was dis-
missed voluntarily by the claimant and not refiled within 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
The claimant filed a timely claim with the Commis-
sion alleging an occupational disease that occurred on 
January 1, 1988 as a result of exposure to lead. The 
claimant's employer filed an Employer's First Report of 
Injury on February 8, 1988, and the two-year statute of 
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limitations began to run. When the matter proceeded to 
a hearing before the Commission, the claimant request-
ed that his claim be dismissed. The Commission com-
plied with this request and dismissed the claim on 
December 8,1989. 
Subsequently, on February 22, 1990, after the two-
year statute of limitations had run, the claimant filed 
another claim for benefits alleging exposure to lead and 
listing the date of disablement as January 17, 1990. 
Hearings were held before the Commission, whereupon 
the Commission dismissed the second claim as time 
barred, finding that the actual date of the claimant's 
disablement was January 1, 1988. The claimant there-
afterrequested a rehearing whereupon the Commission 
issued an order rescinding and annulling its initial 
award. The Commission indicated that it was using its 
discretionary powers to determine that the initial claim 
was timely filed and that the second claim was merely a 
motion to reinstate the first claim, thus avoiding the bar 
oflimitations. The employer appealed and moved for 
summary judgment in the circuit court on the ground 
that the Commission's broad discretionary powers did 
not permit a commissioner to disregard the statute of 
limitations in order to revive a claim. The court granted 
summary judgment for the employer, and the claimant 
appealed to the court of special appeals. 
The court of special appeals affirmed the decision of 
the circuit court. The court of special appeals recog-
nized that the Commission has the power to modify any 
of its prior findings or orders pursuant to section 9-736 
of the Act. In this case, however, the Commission made 
no "findings" in its initial withdrawal order. The 
Commission simply granted the claimant's request to 
withdraw his claim. The court stated that prior case law, 
as well as the statute itself, makes it clear that a claimant 
who voluntarily dismisses his claim without prejudice 
must refile the claim within the two-year statute of 
limitations. The court stated that nothing in the Act 
empowers the Commission to reinstate a claim that was 
voluntarily dismissed and has since expired under the 
statute of limitations. Although the court recognized 
the discretionary powers of the Commission, the court 
emphasized that it has no power to create an unautho-
rized exception to the Workers' Compensation Act. 
Southerly v. Perfect Auto Radiator Co., 101 Md. App. 
113,643 A.2d 501 (1994). Decided June 30, 1994. 
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C. Limitations Period for Reopening Claims 
- No.3 
The court of special appeals ruled that payment of 
an attorney's fee imposed by the Commission against an 
employer and insurer for failure to comply with a prior 
order is not compensation under the Act. Therefore, 
such payment does not extend the five-year period of 
limitations to seek modification of a prior award after 
the last compensation payment. 
The claimant was injured in March 1981 and the last 
payment of compensation benefits was in September 
1985. In 1987 and 1988, the employer and insurer were 
required to pay a fee to the claimant's attorney for 
failure to comply with Commission orders, and pay-
ment of this penalty was made in 1989. The claimant's 
petition to modify the nature and extent of disability was 
filed on October 18, 1991, more than five years after the 
payment of sanctions. The Commission held that the 
claim was not barred by limitations and the employer 
appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commission 
and ruled that payment of counsel fees under the 1987 
and 1988 orders were not payments of compensation 
within the meaning of the Act. Accordingly, the claim 
was barred by limitations. The claimant appealed to the 
court of special appeals which affirmed the circuit court. 
The court first ruled that payment of counsel fees is 
compensation within the meaning of the Act only when 
the fees are approved by the Commission, and the fees 
are payable from compensation awarded a claimant, at 
which time the fee becomes a lien on the compensation 
awarded. In the present case, the fee ordered due to the 
employer's and insurer's failure to comply with Com-
mission orders in 1987 and 1988 was not compensation 
within the meaning of the Act as the fee was not payable 
from compensation awarded to the claimant, and there-
fore, the fee did not become a lien on any compensation 
awarded. Rather, the fee was a sanction or penalty. 
Accordingly, the court ruled that payments of penalties 
do not toll the running of the applicable statute of 
limitations and the claim for worsening of condition was 
barred. 
The court also rejected the claimant's argumentthat 
the employer and insurer should be estopped from 
raising limitations due to its unscrupulous actions in-
cluding three baseless appeals from Commission deci-
sions. Moreover, the claimant alleged that she was 
precluded from reopening her case from June 1988 
through March 1991 due to pending appeals which 
were eventually dismissed. The claimant asserted that 
the Commission lacked jurisdiction to hear any new 
disability claims during the pending appeal. The court 
rej ected that argument, indicating that the Act does not 
prevent the claimant from filing a request for a hearing 
to avoid the statutory bar during a pending appeal. 
Moreover, the employer and insurer did not induce the 
claimant to refrain from filing issues with the Commis-
sion or engage in any fraudulent conduct or represent 
that it would refrain from asserting the defense of 
limitation. Finally, the employer and insurer were not 
obligated to sua sponte begin temporary disability 
payments following the claimant's surgery where no 
request for benefits were made. 
Stevens v. Rite Aid Corp., 102 Md. App. 636,651 A.2d 
397 (1994). Decided December 30, 1994. 
D. Enforcement of Settlement Agreements 
The court of appeals ruled that the Commission has 
within its discretion the power to approve or disap-
prove fully executed settlement agreements submitted 
to it. Following submission of a fully executed agree-
ment, the employer and insurer attempted to unilater-
ally rescind the agreement since the claimant died of 
unrelated causes eight days prior to a hearing set to 
review the settlement. The Commission ruled that the 
insurer could not withdraw from the agreement and 
ordered that the agreement be approved. The circuit 
court granted the claimant's motion for summary judg-
ment. The court of special appeals held that a settlement 
agreement submitted to the Commission is a contract 
subject to a condition subsequent. It is therefore bind-
ing on the parties pending only the Commission's 
approval. 
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the 
court of special appeals, but provided a different ratio-
nale. The court of appeals ruled that the legislature 
empowered the Commission with the exclusive juris-
diction and discretion to approve or disapprove settle-
ments. Once a settlement agreement has been fully 
executed and submitted to the Commission, a party may 
not unilaterally withdraw from the agreement without 
good cause being shown to the satisfaction of the 
Commission at a hearing on the matter. Accordingly, 
the court of appeals modified the decision of the court 
of special appeals in that a party desiring to withdraw 
from an agreement submitted to the Commission may 
request that the Commission exercise its discretion to 
modify, disapprove, or add certain provisions. Any 
decision made is solely within the discretion of the 
Commission. Ifthe settlement is approved, it is effective 
and binding on all parties; if it is disapproved, it is not 
effective and may not be enforced. 
B. Frank Joy Co. v. Isaac, 333 Md. 628, 636 A.2d 1016 
(1994). Decided February 10, 1994. 
E. Jurisdiction over Medical Bills 
The court of special appeals ruled that all claims for 
payment of medical expenses must initially be presented 
to the Workers' Compensation Commission for ap-
proval. A health care provider brought a declaratory 
judgment action against the employer and insurer to 
recover for medical treatment furnished to the claimant 
allegedly due to a work-related injury. The Commission 
had determined that the medical treatment rendered by 
the health care provider was causally related to the 
accidental injury. The employer appealed to the circuit 
court, which reversed the Commission and determined 
that the medical treatment in question was not causally 
related to the compensable injury. After the circuit court 
decision and the employer and insurer's refusal to pay 
the outstanding medical expenses, the health care pro-
vider filed a declaratory judgment action in the circuit 
court seeking payment ofthe disputed medical expens-
es. The circuit court granted the employer and insurer's 
motion to dismiss and the health care provider appealed 
to the court of special appeals. 
The court affirmed the circuit court's decision and 
held that the Maryland Uniform Declaratory Judgment 
Act, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-409(b), restricted the right to 
file for declaratory judgment by providing that if a 
statute provides a special form of remedy for a specific 
type of case, that statutory remedy shall be followed in 
lieu of proceeding under this subtitle. The court further 
held that the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act is 
a special form of remedy for a specific type of case as set 
forth in the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and, 
therefore, must be followed in lieu of a proceeding under 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. Accordingly, 
the court ruled that all claims for compensation for 
medical treatment must be presented to the Commission 
for approval. Finally, the court rej ected the health care 
provider's contention that the Commission was divest-
ed of jurisdiction following the appeal, because the 
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Commission is divested of jurisdiction only during the immunity from liability provided to the employer 
pendency of an appeal and thereafter resumes jurisdic- under the Workers' Compensation Act. 
tion over all issues. 
Hastings v. Mechalske, 336 Md. 663, 650 A.2d 274 
Desi v. Northwestern Nat 'I Ins. Group, 99 Md. App. (1994). Decided December 9, 1994. 
640,638 A.2d 1242 (1994). Decided April 1, 1994. 
IV. THIRD-PARTY CASES 
A. Immunity 0/ Supervisory Co-employee from 
Tort Suit 
The court of appeals ruled that a supervisory co-
employee is immune from liability to an inj ured employ-
ee under the Workers' Compensation Act if, at the time 
of the accident, (1) he is performing a non-delegable 
duty of the employer and (2) he performed that duty 
during the course of his employment. 
The claimant was injured while performing work for 
a subcontractor on a construction contract to build a 
loading dock. The supervisory co-employee, employed 
by the general contractor, was responsible for the day-
to-day activities ofthe project. The claimant's injury 
occurred when he was knocked 25-30 feet off a scaf-
folding platform which was rammed by a backhoe. The 
driver assigned by the supervisory co-employee to 
operate the backhoe had little experience using this type 
of equipment. The claimant filed suit against the 
supervisory co-employee on the ground that he had 
negligently entrusted the backhoe to an inexperienced 
driver. The supervisory co-employee asserted that his 
actions were undertaken inhis supervisory capacity and 
that he enjoyed the same immunity from civil liability as 
his employer. 
The court of appeals affirmed the court of special 
appeals' decision and noted thatthe Workers' Compen-
sation Act provides an exclusive remedy for injured 
employees against their employers. Thus, a supervisory 
co-employee performing a non-delegable duty of the 
employer within the course of his employment -- such 
as providing a safe place to work -- cannot be held liable 
in a civil action. Such an employee is entitled to the 
benefit of the employer's immunity. The court of 
appeals concluded that a supervisory co-employee may 
be subject to liability only for negligently breaching a 
duty of care which he personally owes to the employee. 
However, a supervisory co-employee performing a 
non-delegable duty in the course of his employment, 
even if done so negligently, does not assume a personal 
duty toward his fellow employees and is clothed with 
B. Unauthorized Settlement o/Third-Party Claim 
The court of special appeals ruled that an unautho-
rized settlement between a claimant and third-party 
defendant does not foreclose a claimant's future right to 
compensation. Rather, if the employer and insurer can 
prove prejudice by showing that the settlement was 
unreasonably low, the employer and insurer can be 
entitled to an additional offset up to a reasonable dollar 
value of the third-party claim as determined by the 
Commission. 
The claimant was injured and pursued a workers' 
compensation claim and third-party action. Despite a 
workers' compensation lien, the claimant settled the 
third-party claim for $6,500.00 without authorization 
or knowledge by the workers' compensation carrier. At 
a workers' compensation hearing, the Commission 
determined that the claim for benefits was terminated by 
the unauthorized settlement. On the advise of counsel, 
no appeal was taken. The claimant's back condition 
worsened, and the claimant became permanently totally 
disabled. Based on the settlement of the third-party 
claim and the Commission's final order, the claimant 
was wholly without benefits and pursued a malpractice 
claim against her former attorney. At trial in the 
malpractice action, the claimant as plaintiff presented 
expert testimony that the Commission's actions were 
erroneous and that an appeal to the circuit court would 
have been meritorious. Moreover, the expert testimony 
opined that the case could have been decided on sum-
mary judgment without any need for expert witnesses. 
The trial court struck the expert testimony, finding it to 
be a misstatement of the law and granted the attorney's 
motion for judgment. The court of special appeals 
subsequently reversed. 
The court noted that the precise threshold issue, 
whether an employee's future right to compensation 
can be foreclosed due to an unauthorized settlement of 
a third-party claim, was a case of first impression. The 
court ruled that the Commission erred since the Work-
ers' Compensation Act set forth specific grounds for 
termination on benefits, which did not include unautho-
rized settlements. Moreover, legislative history indicat-
ed an intent that a third-party claim should never result 
in a decrease of benefits under the Act. Although the 
employer and insurer could not avoid future benefits, 
when they are materially prejudiced due to an unreason-
able unauthorized settlement, the Commission should 
determine a reasonable dollar value of the third-party 
claim and allow the employer and insurer an offset up to 
that amount. At the point where a claimant would have 
received benefits equal to this reasonable amount, 
future benefits would resume. 
Based on the court's conclusion of this issue, it 
reversed the circuit court's decision in the malpractice 
suit and remanded with instructions that the claimant's 
experts were correct and that the sole issue was whether 
the attorney's advice that the claimant's appeal would 
not succeed was reasonable and in accordance with the 
standards of the legal profession. 
Ankney v. Franch, 103 Md. App. 83,652 A.2d 1138 
(1995). Decided February 1, 1995. 
IV. INSURANCE COVERAGE 
The U. S. District Court for the District of Mary land 
ruled that a private insurance company providing work-
ers' compensation insurance to a Maryland corporation 
for non-Maryland based employees working in Penn-
sylvania is also liable for claims by the company's 
Maryland based employees for injuries sustained while 
working temporarily in Pennsylvania. The plaintiff, 
L.R. Willson & Sons, had its principal place of business 
in Maryland and performed work at construction sites 
in Maryland, Delaware, D.C., Pennsylvania, and Vir-
ginia. Out-of-state work was performed by either 
assigning Maryland based employees to temporary out-
of-state assignments and/or by hiring out-of-state em-
ployees to work temporarily at the out-of-state con-
struction sites. The plaintiff purchased workers' com-
pensation insurance for its Maryland based employees 
from the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund. Addition-
ally, the plaintiff purchased workers' compensation 
insurance from PMA Group, the defendant, with the 
intent of covering the non-Maryland based employees 
who were hired temporarily and were injured outside of 
Mary land. The plaintiff did not intend that its Maryland 
based employees who worked outside of Maryland be 
covered by this policy. Nonetheless, the defendant 
determined that the plaintiff owed additional premiums 
because it concluded that it was exposed to liability 
under Pennsylvania law for the plaintiff s Maryland 
based employees who were temporarily assigned to 
workplaces in Pennsylvania and who performed work 
in Pennsylvania. 
TheU.S.DistrictCourtgrantedsurnmaryjudgment 
in favor of the defendant. The court noted that the 
Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act applies to all 
injuries occurring within the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania irrespective ofthe place where the contract of 
hiring was made, renewed, or extended. The court 
rendered this decision notwithstanding the plaintiffs 
argument that Pennsylvania should give full effect to 
certain agreements which were signed by each of the 
Maryland based employees. In signing the agreement, 
the employee indicated that in the event ofinjury, he/she 
agreed that all claims would be filed and rights would be 
governed by the provisions of the Maryland Worker:s' 
Compensation. The court rejected the plaintiff s argu-
ment and stated that "no private agreement can reduce 
workers' compensation coverage for work and injuries 
which occur in Pennsylvania, unless such agreement is 
permitted by a Pennsylvania statutory provision." The 
court noted that Pennsy lvania has no such statute with 
respect to workers' compensation. 
The effect of this decision is that Maryland employ-
ers who occasionally send their workers into Pennsyl-
vania on business may have to cover those employees 
with workers' compensation insurance for both states, 
doubling the employer's cost, despite the fact that 
employees may have agreed to have their claim filed in 
Maryland. 
L.R. Willson & Sons v. PMA Group, 867 F.Supp. 335 
(D. Md. 1994). Filed November 15, 1994. 
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